I’m here at the Society for Cross-Cultural Research / Society for Anthropological Sciences joint meetings in Albuquerque, NM. Tonight we will have a keynote address by Nobel laureate / polymath Murray Gell-Mann on ‘The Evolution of Languages’. I’ll be very interested to see what Gell-Mann has to say on this issue that is close to some of my own research interests. Stay tuned.
Archive for the ‘Evolution’ Category
Posted by schrisomalis on February 18, 2010
Posted by schrisomalis on November 26, 2009
Today, most of my colleagues are toiling away in an attempt to cook and carve some sort of fowl. Me, well, I’m Canadian, and even though I work over in the Dark Nether Reaches and get to enjoy its three-day week, I live over here in Canada’s Deep South and get to … have a flu shot and catch up on posting some links of interest?
I don’t have much to add about the sad passing of Dell Hymes last week. I didn’t know him but I know many people who did, and no one who purports to be a linguistic anthropologist (or sociolinguist … or anthropological linguist … or …) can possibly be ignorant of his work. The NYT description of him as a “Linguist with a Wide Net” is utterly evocative and has me imagining it literally. He will be missed, but his legacy on the discipline will remain vital for decades.
While Turkey officially switched from the Arabic to the Roman alphabet in the 1920s, at the same time it prohibited the use of letters not used to represent Turkish – which includes the ‘ordinary’ Roman letters Q, W, and X. While sometimes portrayed as a ban on those letters specifically, it is a more general ban on non-Turkish characters, as far as I can tell, which would seem to prohibit all sorts of texts. Ostensibly designed to promote national unity and secular rule, the law has only been applied to Turks of Kurdish descent. As someone who until last year was a resident of a region where texts written in my native language are under severe legal constraints, this has been a matter of some interest and concern to me for a few years now. Mark Liberman tells us more over at Language Log.
Researchers at the University of Edinburgh are investigating the cultural evolution of language, arguing that language change is patterned by the biological constraints of the human brain – in other words, language changes to accomodate itself to the sorts of brains we possess. They are examining this idea experimentally using an artificial language of simple syllables used to describe alien-looking fruit … which is not as bizarre as I may have made it sound. Edinburgh is doing a lot of exciting work these days in linguistics, what with Jim Hurford, Simon Kirby, and Geoff Pullum (among others) housed there.
Relatedly, Marc Changizi claims (following up on work he has been doing for the past several years) that there are strong cognitive / evolutionary constraints on the graphemes (discrete written units) of writing systems, creating similiarites across writing systems that reflect the cultural evolution of graphemes to accomodate the needs and capacities of the human brain. I have more doubts about this one, which I may talk about in more detail – basically my concern is that the cross-cultural analysis is weak and inadequately accounts for borrowing (Galton’s problem). But it’s interesting work that deserves some attention. Hat tip to The Lousy Linguist for both this item and the previous one).
Lastly, Alun Salt has recently published a very interesting paper, ‘The Astronomical Orientation of Ancient Greek Temples‘ arguing for a more rigorous statistical approach to archaeoastronomy and establishing solar orientations. He’s not the first to use statistical analysis in archaeoastronomy but he does note with some dismay that there is generally insufficient concern with quantitative reasoning among archaeoastronomers to be able to apply statistical tests effectively. Salt highlights some of the complexities in making these determinations – leap second daters, take note! More important than the article itself, though, is its venue, the open-access PLoS ONE. Although ‘cheap’ by open-access standards, the fact that authors must pay ‘only’ $1350 to cover publication costs is, I think, problematic in humanities and social science disciplines where grants are small and getting proportionally smaller.
To my American friends, good luck with your birds, and thanks for reading!
Posted by schrisomalis on October 2, 2009
The annual Ig Nobel awards “for achievements that first make people laugh, then make them think” were given out last night, and once again, anthropology has been well-represented. Catherine Bertenshaw Douglas and Peter Rowlinson won the award for veterinary medicine for their demonstration that cows that are humanized by giving them names produce more milk than those that remain, uh, anonymous. Although they are veterinary scientists their work appears in the interdisciplinary anthropological journal Anthrozoös. Meanwhile, the Ig Nobel for physics went to the biological anthropologists Katherine Whitcome, Liza Shapiro and Daniel Lieberman for their work (which appeared in Nature a couple of years ago) explaining why pregnant women don’t tip over. This is extremely important as it bears directly on the evolutionary costs and benefits of bipedalism, among other issues.
See the full list of winners here.
Bertenshaw, Catherine and Peter Rowlinson. 2009. Exploring Stock Managers’ Perceptions of the Human-Animal Relationship on Dairy Farms and an Association with Milk Production. Anthrozoös, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 59-69.
Whitcome, Katherine, Liza J. Shapiro & Daniel E. Lieberman. 2007. Fetal Load and the Evolution of Lumbar Lordosis in Bipedal Hominins. Nature, vol. 450, 1075-1078.
Posted by schrisomalis on February 24, 2009
I am extraordinarily pleased to announce that I have been officially inducted into the roster of Steves at Project Steve, maintained by the National Center for Science Education. As Steve #1032, I join at least 1031 of my peers who, in addition to holding doctorates in fields related to evolution, are named Steve, Stephen, Steven, Esteban, Stephanie, etc. My sole duty as a member of this illustrious society is to promote, through undogmatic scientific inquiry, teaching and research about the origin and evolution of life. To which end, I can do no better than to quote from the NCSE itself:
Evolution is a vital, well-supported, unifying principle of the biological sciences, and the scientific evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the idea that all living things share a common ancestry. Although there are legitimate debates about the patterns and processes of evolution, there is no serious scientific doubt that evolution occurred or that natural selection is a major mechanism in its occurrence. It is scientifically inappropriate and pedagogically irresponsible for creationist pseudoscience, including but not limited to “intelligent design,” to be introduced into the science curricula of our nation’s public schools. (NCSE, 2008)
Posted by schrisomalis on February 18, 2009
In a couple of hours I’m off to Las Vegas for the 2009 Society for Anthropological Sciences conference, where I’m presenting a paper entitled, “Frequency dependent biases in the transmission of communication technologies”. If any of my readers are going to be there (unlikely though that may be), it’ll be … well, it will be more compelling than the abstract that follows below makes it seem:
Frequency dependent biases in the transmission of communication technologies
Frequency dependent bias is a form of horizontal cultural transmission bias in which the frequency of a cultural trait influences the likelihood that others will adopt it. Previously seen as a unitary phenomenon, frequency dependence in fact consists of three separate types, each involving distinct decision-making processes and having different patterns of acceptance, retention, and abandonment. In particular, communication technologies, whose popularity determines their utility, exhibit unusual characteristics of cultural transmission. A brief case study from the phylogenetic history of written numerals demonstrates the usefulness of considering the different effects of frequency for the adoption of new communication technologies. More broadly, the prevalence of frequency dependent phenomena in various cultural evolutionary contexts suggests the need to evaluate decision-making processes more rigorously when evaluating the adoption and retention of cultural traits.
I’ll try to put together something interesting in the way of a blog post while I’m away, provided I don’t get sucked in by the charms of the city. Catch you on the flipside!
Posted by schrisomalis on February 12, 2009
As you probably know if you are reading this blog, today is the 200th birthday of Charles Darwin, FRS (1809 – 1882), probably the finest naturalist of his age and the originator of the theory of evolution by means of natural selection. In my evolutionary anthropology and history of anthropology classes I always start by asking how many people have heard of Darwin – of course every student raises their hand – and follow that up by asking how many of them have actually read Darwin, at which point the crickets start chirping. For the anthropologist, The Origin of Species isn’t especially interesting, given that Darwin only alludes to the probability of human evolution in the final pages of that expansive volume. For me, the more interesting text is The Descent of Man (1871), which neatly adumbrates virtually every significant debate in evolutionary anthropology, including many in linguistic anthropology. This is not to say that Darwin was always right, or that nothing has happened in the past 125 years. But he was asking the right questions, many of the same questions with which we still struggle, and I can think of no better tribute than to discuss his work in the context of those questions. I present a selection of quotations from the Project Gutenberg e-text of the 1874 second edition of the Descent, followed by questions and citations to recent literature dealing with these issues.
One can hardly doubt, that a man-like animal who possessed a hand and arm sufficiently perfect to throw a stone with precision, or to form a flint into a rude tool, could, with sufficient practice, as far as mechanical skill alone is concerned, make almost anything which a civilised man can make. The structure of the hand in this respect may be compared with that of the vocal organs, which in the apes are used for uttering various signal-cries, or, as in one genus, musical cadences; but in man the closely similar vocal organs have become adapted through the inherited effects of use for the utterance of articulate language.
- What is the relationship between tool manufacture and the use of language? (Stout et al. 2008)
- To what extent is ape vocalization a precursor to, or analogous to, human speech? (Arbib et al. 2008)
The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously parallel. But we can trace the formation of many words further back than that of species, for we can perceive how they actually arose from the imitation of various sounds. We find in distinct languages striking homologies due to community of descent, and analogies due to a similar process of formation. The manner in which certain letters or sounds change when others change is very like correlated growth. We have in both cases the reduplication of parts, the effects of long-continued use, and so forth.
Languages, like organic beings, can be classed in groups under groups; and they can be classed either naturally according to descent, or artificially by other characters. Dominant languages and dialects spread widely, and lead to the gradual extinction of other tongues. A language, like a species, when once extinct, never, as Sir C. Lyell remarks, reappears. The same language never has two birth-places. Distinct languages may be crossed or blended together.
- How closely can the analogy between linguistic and biological change be drawn? (Chater et al. 2009)
- To what extent is linguistic change phylogenetic? (Gray et al. 2009)
- Should language change and language death be seen as parallel to biological extinction? (Mufwene 2004)
From the fundamental differences between certain languages, some philologists have inferred that when man first became widely diffused, he was not a speaking animal; but it may be suspected that languages, far less perfect than any now spoken, aided by gestures, might have been used, and yet have left no traces on subsequent and more highly-developed tongues. Without the use of some language, however imperfect, it appears doubtful whether man’s intellect could have risen to the standard implied by his dominant position at an early period.
- What is the relationship between the evolution of language and the evolution of modern human cognitive capacities? (Coward and Gamble 2008)
- What is the nature and structure of ‘proto-language’? (Botha 2008)
With respect to perfection, the following illustration will best shew how easily we may err: a Crinoid sometimes consists of no less than 150,000 pieces of shell, all arranged with perfect symmetry in radiating lines; but a naturalist does not consider an animal of this kind as more perfect than a bilateral one with comparatively few parts, and with none of these parts alike, excepting on the opposite sides of the body. He justly considers the differentiation and specialisation of organs as the test of perfection. So with languages: the most symmetrical and complex ought not to be ranked above irregular, abbreviated, and bastardised languages, which have borrowed expressive words and useful forms of construction from various conquering, conquered, or immigrant races.
- Is it possible to classify languages according to principles of regularity or purity, and is it worthwhile to do so? (Hoffman 2008)
- What is the role of migration, warfare and cultural contact in understanding the evolution of languages? (Nichols 2008)
One can only imagine that Darwin would be pleased to see such active and interesting research being done so long after his own seminal efforts. Happy birthday, Mr. Darwin.
Arbib, M. A., K. Liebal, S. Pika, M. C. Corballis, C. Knight, D. A. Leavens, D. Maestripieri, J. E. Tanner, M. A. Arbib, and K. Liebal. 2008. Primate Vocalization, Gesture, and the Evolution of Human Language. Current Anthropology 49, no. 6: 1053-1076.
Botha, R. 2008. Prehistoric shell beads as a window on language evolution. Language and Communication 28, no. 3: 197-212.
Chater, Nick, Florencia Reali, and Morten H. Christiansen. 2009. Restrictions on biological adaptation in language evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 4 (January 27): 1015-1020.
Coward, F., and C. Gamble. 2008. Big brains, small worlds: material culture and the evolution of the mind. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363, no. 1499: 1969-1979.
Gray, R. D., A. J. Drummond, and S. J. Greenhill. 2009. Language Phylogenies Reveal Expansion Pulses and Pauses in Pacific Settlement. Science 323, no. 5913 (January 23): 479-483.
Hoffman, K. E. 2008. Purity and Contamination: Language Ideologies in French Colonial Native Policy in Morocco. Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, no. 03: 724-752.
Mufwene, S. S. 2004. Language birth and death. Annual Review of Anthropology 33, no. 1: 201-222.
Nichols, Johanna. 2008. Language Spread Rates and Prehistoric American Migration Rates. Current Anthropology 49, no. 6 (December 1): 1109-1117.
Stout, D., N. Toth, K. Schick, and T. Chaminade. 2008. Neural correlates of Early Stone Age toolmaking: technology, language and cognition in human evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363, no. 1499: 1939-1949.
and of course …
Darwin, C. 1871. The Descent of Man. London: John Murray.
Posted by schrisomalis on November 9, 2008
John Hawks has a new blog entry entitled ‘Gene-culture models and reductionism‘, which is a thoughtful response to a 2004 letter in American Anthropologist. The letter adopts a highly skeptical view towards the possibility that genetic information can tell us much about prehistoric population history and specifically that it can tell us much about cultural and linguistic prehistory. Hawks, in contrast, takes a more moderate view that leaves open the possibility that we can use genetic, linguistic, and archaeological evidence in tandem, while acknowledging that naively using one as a proxy for the other two is a serious error. Read it, then come back here. It’s short, and I’ll wait.
This is a subject of some interest to me, as a historically and prehistorically-minded linguistic anthropologist (or a linguistically-minded archaeological anthropologist, I don’t care which). The late Bruce Trigger and I published a chapter in 2004 (perhaps we could have found a better venue for it) in which we talk about the naive ways in which Iroquoian studies have used archaeological evidence to attribute ethnic identification (esp. ‘Iroquoian’ vs. ‘Algonkian’) to sites, and linked this problematic issue to broader problems in the use of archaeology to reconstruct language and ethnicity (Chrisomalis and Trigger 2004). The AA letter rightly points out that identifications of tribes or fixed social structures that correlate with genetic populations – or, unmentioned, languages – is problematic, and the notion that any of these must correspond with overarching ethnic identities is doubly problematic, as Barth (1969) argued persuasively decades ago. And yet …
It has long been recognized (since the 19th century at least) that language families are organized phylogenetically and that biological taxa are phylogenetic. This is partly a reflection of reality, and partly a reflection of the mutual reinforcement of phylogenetic models in linguistics and biology through academic interdisciplinary discourse over the past couple hundred years. But the problem noted by Hawks (and which no one interested in the subject can ignore) is that biological transmission (excepting some viruses) is vertical – you get all your genetic material from your parents alone – whereas cultural and linguistic transmission is both vertical and horizontal – that is, you get a lot of your culture from non-kin, including people who may not be part of your ‘tribe’. This is the sort of work that people like Steve Shennan (2002) are doing, and while I am not always convinced by the answers he reaches (particularly, I remain unconvinced that vertical, parent-child linguistic and cultural transmission is as important as he thinks it is), the research deserves more attention than it is getting.
On Tuesday, I am introducing my class to this subject through Colin Renfrew’s (2000) paper ‘At the edge of knowability: towards a prehistory of languages’. Again, I’m not always in agreement with Renfrew (I’m more of a skeptic than he is), but I’m thrilled that people are asking these questions. As social scientists and humanists, linguists and archaeologists need to forcefully assert the relevance of their data, and not let themselves be run roughshod by geneticists who treat their apex of the triad as the cornerstone of all knowledge in the field. One of my hopes for this blog, and for my research in general, is to be able to contribute to ongoing discussions on this issue. This post is, at best, a preliminary introduction to a topic which I suspect you will see here very often in the months (dare I hope for years?) to come.
Barth, F. 1969. Ethnic groups and boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown.
Chrisomalis, S. and B.G. Trigger. 2004. Reconstructing prehistoric ethnicity: problems and possibilities. In In J. V. Wight and J.-L. Pilon (eds), A Passion for the Past: Papers in Honour of James F. Pendergast, pp. 419-433. Mercury Series, Paper No 164. Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization.
Renfrew, C. 2000. At the Edge of Knowability: Towards a Prehistory of Languages. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 10(1): 7-34.
Shennan, S. 2002. Genes, memes and human history: Darwinian archaeology and cultural evolution. London: Thames & Hudson.
Wildcat, D., I. Sumi and V. Deloria Jr. 2004. Commentary: A Response to Doug Jones. American Anthropologist 106, no. 3: 641.
Posted by schrisomalis on October 23, 2008
Apologies for the recent lack of posting; I was out of town in Montreal last week for meetings with co-editors and contributors to two edited volumes, as well as a reception for a teaching award I won last year. But I’m back now!
Anyone who ever knew or worked with Bruce Trigger also was exposed, by proxy, to the work of the archaeologist and social theorist V. Gordon Childe, and in particular to his popular book, Society and Knowledge (Childe 1956). This is as close to epistemology as I can normally bear to get; Childe is aiming to reconcile the imperfection and imperfectibility of human knowledge with the fact that we, as individuals and as societies and as species, have survived and thrived.
Childe begins with the notion that we adapt to the world not as it is, but as we imagine it to be. This is idealism, at least in its moderate form, and Childe freely acknowledges the influence of Kant and Hegel in his thinking. All perception is mediated through cognitive construction. But then, following Hegel’s principle, “The Real is rational and the Rational is real”, Childe insists that there must be some fairly robust correspondence between imagined reality and external reality, or else we would not have survived (Childe 1956: 64). Childe asserts that, “In fact mankind’s biological success in surviving and multiplying affords empirical evidence that useful knowledge of the external world – of man’s environment – is attainable.” (Childe 1956: 64). If it were otherwise, we would not have survived. Controversially (today though not in the 50s) Childe goes still further, linking this notion to cultural change, arguing that the intergenerational transmission and accumulation of knowledge, such as the ‘cumulative accretion of the world of science’, plays into this, ensuring that what is learned is retained in some way (Childe 1956: 66).
For me, this is not just an epistemological argument, but also an evolutionary one. It explains why we have the sorts of thinking brains we have, why we have the sorts of concepts we have, without falling either into pure idealism and presuming either that our thoughts are all that is knowable, or a naive realism that presumes that reality is just as we perceive it to be. And it is in the interstices of cognitive error: those neat little places where we misconstrue the world just enough to tell us about how our minds work, but not enough so that our minds don’t survive – that I see real hope and interest for a cognitive, linguistic, and evolutionary science of anthropology and archaeology.
But enough from me. What do you think?
Childe, V. Gordon. 1956. Society and Knowledge: The Growth of Human Traditions. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Posted by schrisomalis on October 3, 2008
I’ve been ruminating for the past couple of weeks about a little speculative article by Peter Frost, a Canadian evolutionary anthropologist whose primary work is on human sexual dimorphism. In ‘The spread of alphabetical writing may have favored the latest variant of the ASPM gene’ (Frost 2008), Frost makes the remarkable assertion that there is a gene variant whose distribution is best explained by its use for cognitive tasks relating to alphabetic literacy (and specifically not non-alphabetic literacy).
This is a non-peer-reviewed paper in the journal Medical Hypotheses, which publishes papers that its editors (all medical scientists) decide are worthy of note, even when (or especially when) they challenge conventional wisdom. I really like the publish-then-review model, but I do wonder whether in this case what is really needed is a journal (let’s call it, hypothetically, Social Hypotheses) to allow social scientists have a role in determining what is likely to be important or interesting. Because, while the genetic evidence is fairly straightforward, the cognitive and more importantly the historical evidence are the truly controversial elements of Frost’s paper. It rests initially on the following facts, which, not being an expert on human genetics, I’m just going to grant for the sake of argument:
- There is a gene, ASPM, that regulates brain growth, and that has evolved many variants, the latest of which emerged around 6000 years ago in the Middle East.
- It is much more common today in populations in Europe and the Middle East than in East Asia.
- While it relates to brain growth, it does not correlate with increased IQ, suggesting that its cognitive function is subtle.
Frost argues from this, quite plausibly, that this latest variant assists performance on some task relating to cognition and that expanded from a Middle Eastern origin starting around 6000 years ago. He then moves on to the evidence I am more familiar with, to argue that that task was alphabetic writing.
- Writing developed in the Middle East around 3000 BCE, and phonetic alphabets around 2000-1000 BCE. This is sort of true; there is increased phoneticity in Near Eastern scripts over time, and purely phonetic scripts (like Ugaritic and Proto-Sinaitic) emerged as early as the 18th-15th centuries BCE (Lemaire 2008). However, this is in the range of 3500-4000 years ago, not 6000, which makes the emergence of the ASPM variant at 6000 years ago rather early for his timeframe.
- Literacy levels in the ancient world range from 10% – 33% of adult males. False: this may have been true of Roman citizens (which is where Frost’s data come from), but was decidedly not true in the ancient Near East including both Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Levant. Literacy rates certainly varied, but were probably in the 5-7% range at most in the period under consideration (van der Toom 2007: 10).
- East Asian writing is pictorial or ‘ideographic’. False; although there are logographic (word-writing) and ideographic (idea-writing) elements to the Shang Dynasty script (the earliest East Asian writing), just as with modern Chinese writing, there are phonetic complements, rebuses, and other linguistic aspects to the script from an early date. John DeFrancis has essentially demolished the myth of Chinese picture-writing, showing it to be factually inaccurate and often marshalled for derogatory purposes (Defrancis 1989). It is true, however, that there was no ancient alphabetic writing in East Asia. However, Japanese syllabic writing (kana) has been around since the 6th-7th centuries AD.
- Alphabetic writing has different cognitive advantages and demands than non-alphabetic writing. Yes, true, but not in simple or easily understandable ways (Olson 1995). Frost is asserting on the basis of some experimental evidence that information is processed differently by Chinese literates reading in Chinese. But Chinese is only one non-alphabetic script, and it has only been compared cognitively to the Latin alphabet we have no systematic comparative idea of how differently structured scripts affect cognition. Frost’s reasoning certainly implies that Japanese writing should have similar effects to alphabetic writing, despite the near-absence of the ASPM variant there.
- Scribes were prestigious individuals who were highly valued, and those who excelled at scribal tasks would have been better-nourished and wealthier, thus more equipped to have greater reproductive success. Possibly true. However, we have no evidence that they actually did have such success to a greater degree than non-literate elites, or indeed that they enjoyed such success at all. Frost reasons from their social value to their reproductive success, which is plausible but unverified.
- Thus, if the ASPM variant did aid in the processing of alphabetic information, then it would be selected for among scribes and indeed among their offspring, some of whom would be literate but others of whom would not.
It will be clear, I should hope, that my difficulties with the points of evidence above render me highly skeptical of Frost’s conclusion.
As Frost notes, we would expect to find higher rates of the ASPM variant among societies that have long histories of alphabetic writing, if his theory is correct, and lower rates among societies that lack such histories. Good evidence for his position would be, as he notes, if African groups like Hausa and Fulani (long-term alphabetic scribal traditions) had high levels of the variant but other groups didn’t (similarly, if there were contrasts between Chinese and Japanese, or between Georgian and Chechen, this would tend to be confirmatory).
But he does not mention another important prediction that I think has been tested and refuted: If the new ASPM variant plays the role he says it does, then East Asians should have difficulty learning alphabetic writing, even if raised using only alphabetic scripts. There simply is no evidence that this is the case, and if it were true, would have incredible implications for public policy. Moreover, the widespread use of purely phonetic scripts like the Japanese syllabaries, which really ought to have the same cognitive consequences as alphabets, should be problematic for East Asians. It isn’t, and this is serious disconfirmatory evidence against the hypothesis.
Frost is right, though, that whatever factor selected for this ASPM variant must have been present / emerged around 6000 years in the Near East but should not have emerged or been significant in East Asia, and factors such as ‘food domestication’ and ‘urbanization’, which emerged in both regions, won’t suffice.
But what about the possibility that the ASPM variant helps promote encephalization with respect to particular plant domesticates – e.g., wheat / barley, the classic Near Eastern domesticates, as opposed to rice and millet (the ancient East Asian domesticates)? Here, the explanation is that individuals with the ASPM variant in the Near East had greater reproductive success because they were better able to use local domesticates to promote encephalization. Individuals who lacked the variant still derived nutrition from these foods, but not in a way that contributed to brain growth. Obviously, I’m not a nutritional anthropologist or a dietician or even an expert on human evolution. I’m not proposing this simply as a plausible alternative, given the complete insufficiency of the alphabetic hypothesis. It is also testable – one would expect that grain-eating societies would have higher levels of the variant than non-grain-eaters in the same general geographic areas, all other things being equal. But now we are back in the realm of Medical Hypotheses and outside anything to which I could claim to be anything more than an interested nonspecialist.
DeFrancis, John. 1984. The Chinese language: fact and fantasy. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Frost, Peter. 2008. The spread of alphabetical writing may have favored the latest variant of the ASPM gene. Medical Hypotheses 70(1): 17-20.
Lemaire, Andre. 2008. The spread of alphabetic scripts (c. 1700 – 500 BCE). Diogenes 55(2): 45-58.
Olson, David R. 1995. Towards a psychology of literacy: on the relations between speech and writing. Cognition 60(1): 83-104.
van der Toom, Karel. 2007. Scribal culture and the making of the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Posted by schrisomalis on September 20, 2008
A recent book by anthropologists Craig Palmer and Lyle Steadman, The Supernatural and Natural Selection: Religion and Evolutionary Success (Steadman and Palmer 2008) attempts to account for the evolution of religion in a novel way, linking sociality, communicative practice, and reproductive fitness. I will be very interested to see the book (whose publication date is this week) and may give it a more thorough review then; for now, I am relying on a recent report in ScienceDaily.
The claim that interests me most is the assertion that religion does not primarily serve an individual, cognitive function – that its evolutionary basis is not that it explains the unexplainable or gives comfort in times of need. Rather, they argue, religious belief serves to increase social cohesion and cooperative behavior among non-kin because of the kin-like model of society it creates. This, so far, is not a novel claim, and can be found in anthropologists as far back as Edward Tylor (1920 ).
Palmer and Steadman go further, however, using observable instances of communication of the acceptance of supernatural claims as analogues to the way that children accept their parents’ influence. Rather than focusing about what people say about what they believe as evidence for what they believe, they treat what people say as communicative acts and observe what consequences these acts have on other human beings. In other words, they assert, religion creates kin-like social ties through the mutual acceptance of otherwise unobservable social realities. Further evidence for this position, they assert, is found in the widespread use of basic kin terms (especially for parents, siblings, and children) in religions throughout the world. This is an interesting combination of linguistic, anthropological, and evolutionary-psychological insights that deserves
Now, this theory is bound to cause controversy. I don’t even want to address whether I think it is correct until I have a look at the book. I’ve been interested in the rather different theory espoused by Pascal Boyer in his The Naturalness of Religious Ideas (Boyer 1994), which focuses on the evidence from child development and is essentially a cognitive account rather than a social one. I’ll be particularly interested to see how Palmer and Steadman have handled the cross-cultural evidence, and the extent to which they are able to deal with differences as well as similarities among the world’s religious systems.
Boyer, Pascal. 1994. The naturalness of religious ideas. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Steadman, Lyle B. and Craig T. Palmer. 2008. The supernatural and natural selection: religion and evolutionary success. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Tylor, Edward B. 1920 . Primitive culture. New York: Putnam.